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A CHILD'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN DIVORCE CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS1
Few states provide for separate representation of the child in
divorce custody proceedings.2 In the majority of jurisdictions, counsel
for the parents negotiate a placement decision which the judge accepts
without review.3 If a dispute leads to trial, the child is seldom a party.4
The court and the adult contestants are presumed to speak for the
minor's interests.
This traditional denial of equal standing for the'child has received
criticism, but seldom on constitutional grounds.' In light of the limited
1. This note focuses on procedural, not substantive, due process. Counsel refers
to a licensed attorney enjoying all the rights and obligations of lawyers for the adult
parties. The specific subject matter discussed here concerns divorce custody, although
some of the arguments developed below may apply to adoption, neglect, delinquency, and
dependency cases. The word "proceedings" is used to refer to all aspects of a custody
determination that have a bearing on the ultimate placement, including parental negotia-
tions, counseling, court hearings, and modification orders.
2. Only one state, Oregon, requires appointment of independent counsel in di-
vorce custody proceedings. See State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah County v.
Wade, 527 P.2d 753 (Ore. Ct. App. 1974).
For a number of states, the power to appoint counsel is discretionary. See, e.g.,
ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-321 (1956); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-116 (1973);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-43 (Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.12 (Supp. 1975-
76); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-358 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REv. STAT. § 107.425 (1974); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-3-11.2 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 594 (1974).
Several states make provision for the appointment of a guardian ad litem or
"friend of the court" in cases of contested custody or at the court's discretion. See, e.g.,
Carle v. Carle, 503 P.2d 1050 (Alas. 1972) (guardian); Barth v. Barth, 39 Ohio Op.
2d 83, 225 N.E.2d 866 (C.P. Stark County 1967) (guardian); Zinni v. Zinni, 103 R.I.
417, 238 A.2d 373 (1968) (guardian); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.090 (Supp. 1974)
(friend of the court); MICH. Compn,. LAws ANN. H§ 552.251-.253 (1967) (friend of the
court); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.10 (Supp. 1975-76) (guardian); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.090 (Supp. 1974) (friend of the court).
3. "In practice, with over ninety percent of divorce actions ending up as default
or uncontested cases, the court routinely accepts the recommendations of the parties."
Hansen, The Role and Rights of Children in Divorce Actions, 6 J. FAMLY L. 1, 2
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Hansen, Rights of Children].
4. See Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the
State, 4 FAmILy L.Q. 320, 327-31 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Kleinfeld].
5. At the time of the writing of this note, there existed only one article specif-
ically addressed to the subject of a constitutional right. See Note, Due Process for Chil-
dren: A Right to Counsel in Custody Proceedings, 4 N.Y.U. REv. L. w & Soc. CHLANGE
177 (1974).
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judicial scrutiny of custody decrees, however, it is important to consider
whether denial of independent counsel in divorce custody proceedings
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Discus-
sion will focus upon the nature of the interests which children of
divorcing parents have at stake, available means of protecting those
interests, the elements of an argument for the constitutional right to
separate representation, and suggestions for implementing such a right.
The Impact of Divorce on the Child
The Statistical Vantage
Divorce affects a significant proportion of all children under the
age of eighteen. Of the nearly one million dissolutions annually, 6 sixty-
two percent involve minors.7 The actual number of children affected
exceeds 1.2 million." This figure represents 11.9 of every one thou-
sand persons under the age of majority each year.9
Sociological and Psychological Vantage
These figures assume added weight when considered with sociolog-
ical and psychological studies of divorce and child growth. 1" Research
indicates that the breakup of the family may have a detrimental affect
on a child's normal maturation. For example, studies indicate a poten-
tial for reduced self-esteem" and psychosomatic illnesses such as night-
mares, crying spells, stammering and bed-wetting.' 2 Several analyses
6. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 67 (1975).
7. Freed & Foster, The Shuffled Child and Divorce Court, 10 TRIAL, May/June,
1974, at 26 [hereinafter cited as Freed & Foster, The Shuffled Child].
8. This figure is calculated by multiplying the average number of children per
decree, at the 1969 rate of 1.31, by the number of divorces per year in 1973. See BU-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 66 (1975); 3 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEA.LTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, VITAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1970, 2-9 (1974).
9. 3 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES 1970, 2-9 (1974).
10. See generally R. BLOOD, THE FAMILY (1972); M. BRECKENRIDGE & M. MUR-
PHY, GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE YOUNG CHILD (1969); J. DESPERT, CHILDREN
OF DIVORCE (1962); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT]; M.
HUNT, THE WORLD OF THE FORMERLY MARRIED, (1966) [hereinafter cited as HUNT];
Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21
SYRACUSE L. REv. 55 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Watson]. But cf. Hunt, Help
Wanted: Divorce Counselor, in THE CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FAMILY 229-30 (W.
Goode ed. 1971).
11. See generally M. ROSENBERG, SOCIETY AND THE ADOLESCENT SELF-IMAGE 85-
106 (1965).
12. See generally HUNT, supra note 10, at 287.
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have found a tendency among males raised without fathers to exhibit
increased incidence of aggressiveness, junvenile delinquency,13 and low
school achievement.' 4 Comparable reports concerning females raised
without mothers are not available.' 5 Finally, a few studies demonstrate
a tendency for the child raised in a broken home 'to experience an
unhappy marriage as an adult.16
This potential for personal hardship threatens equally harmful
consequences for the state. Substandard educational performance, con-
tact with the juvenile justice system, and subsequent marital conflict can
all translate into economic burdens for the taxpayer.
Summary of the Law of Divorce Custody
Considering the above, the custody award plays a significant role in
a child's life. From the perspective of the court and the attorneys for
the adult parties, it represents an attempt to select the environment most
conducive to normal emotional development. From the child's perspec-
tive,' 7 it represents an opportunity to assert control over his or her future
through expression of a preference for placement.
Unfortunately, the vast majority of custody settlements receives the
rubber stamp of the court without an investigation to discover whether
attorneys for the adult parties have considered the interests of the
child.18 Such a policy is difficult to justify, because the state has a clear
interest in protecting the stability of the family unit,' 9 and because an
inadequately considered decision may foment the instability it is in-
tended to avoid.
In response to the routine failure to place the impact of divorce on
the minor in proper perspective, a number of commentators have advo-
13. See generally C. BURT, THE YOUNG DELINQUENT (1938); S. GLUECK & E.
GLUECK, DELINQUENTS IN THE MAKING (1952); HUNT, supra note 10; Bodenheimer, The
Multiplicity of Child Custody Proceedings-Problems of California Law, 23 STAN. L.
REV. 703, 727 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer].
14. See Kleinfeld, supra note 4, at 331.
15. See id. at 331 n.49.
16. See Barker, The Child and Divorce, 73 CASE & COMMENT, Nov.-Dec., 1968,
at 36.
17. See text accompanying notes 162-83 infra.
18. See note 3 infra.
19. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). "Apart
from the increasing incidence of custody adjudication and the greater awareness of, and
interest in, child custody matters, there is a broader concern that must be primary in
importance; that concern is society's obvious interest in the development of well-adjusted
and healthy children who will grow into emotionally mature and contributing citizens."
Shepherd, Solomon's Sword: Adjudication of Child Custody Questions, 8 U. RICH. L.
REv. 151, 154 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Shepherd].
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cated the need for independent counsel to represent the interests of the
child.2" Nevertheless, evidence of the numbers of minors affected by
divorce, of the potential for psychological damage, and of the great
many settlements which receive little review does not alone justify equal
standing for adults and minors in the custody proceeding. The need for
separate representation and for its constitutional guarantee becomes
more apparent after consideration of the standards and procedures by
which courts make awards of custody.
Guiding Principles for the Award of Divorce Custody
Parens Patriae
The standards for award of child custody derive from a quasi-legal
doctrine of Roman private law called patria potestas, literally paternal
power, under which the father had an absolute right to control of his
children.21 The doctrine became a part of the English law but declined
in significance by the fourteenth century.22 In feudal England, custody
was an incident to the guardianship of lands.23  The state had an
interest in the uninterrupted passage of title to property, and custody
was simply a matter of placement with the parent having land to convey
or bequeath. A sense of responsibility for the child was a secondary
development. Late in the seventeenth century, the chancery courts
assumed jurisdiction over custody matters and exercised their powers of
parens patriae24 to protect the welfare of the child. In practice, the
father received the award as natural guardian of his children; the
process was tantamount to a re-emergence of patria potestas.25
The doctrine of parens patriae was absorbed into American prac-
tice, though a strict preference for the father has never developed.2
Today, the principle is invoked to justify the denial of full procedural
due process to the child, as it is claimed that the youth needs protection
from the rigors of adversary proceedings. Consistent with this concept
is the notion that the judge is to act as an "affectionate parent" who
represents the child and is cognizant of his needs. Consequently, the
20. See text accompanying notes 74-88 infra.
21. See Inker & Perretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAMILY
L.Q. 108, 109 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Inker & Perretta]; Shepherd, supra note 19,
at 158-59.
22. Inker & Perretta, supra note 21, at 109; Shepherd, supra note 19, at 158-59.
23. See Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 423 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Foster & Freed, Child Custody]; Shepherd, supra note 19, at 159.
24. Literally, the father of his country; or more generally, the sovereign power of
guardianship over persons under a disability.
25. See Foster & Freed, Child Custody, supra note 23, at 423-24; Inker & Perretta,
supra note 21, at 109; Shepherd, supra note 19, at 159.
26. See Foster & Freed, Child Custody, supra note 23, at 425.
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judge is to enjoy wide discretion in making the custody award."
Use of the parens patriae rationale was critically assessed by the
Supreme Court in In re Gault.28  Moreover, the original grounds for its
existence, protection of tenurial rights and exercise of the prerogatives of
the Crown, have obviously ceased to have any current relevance. None-
theless, one court recently invoked the doctrine to rationalize denial of
separate representation for a child in a divorce custody proceeding.29
The Best Interest of the Child
Another guide for the assessment of custody alternatives is the
"best interest" rule, to which most courts profess adherence.30 The rule
is designed to lead the judge to a determination which best satisfies the
needs of the child. In theory, the interests of the state and the adult
parties assume lesser status. Nonetheless, the "best interest" rule has
not adequately ensured the primacy of the child's welfare in two re-
spects.
One problem is the potential for conflict with the doctrine of
parens patriae.31 While the two principles overlap, the parens patriae
concept affords the court greater discretion. It authorizes the judge to
speak for the child as an incident of the court's historical duty to protect
those who have no other protector.3" The judge is assumed to have
complete discretion. The "best interest" rule attempts to narrow the
latitude of that discretion and shifts a great deal of responsibility to the
attorneys for the opposing parties. The court must theoretically play a
more passive role as arbiter of the settlement proposals offered by the
contestants. The "best interest" doctrine thus seeks to proscribe oppor-
tunities for determinations based upon the judge's subjective prefer-
ences.
27, See, e.g., Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
28. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). "The Latin phrase [parens patriae] proved to be of great
help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional
scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance."
Id. at 16.
29. See Leigh v. Aiken, 311 So. 2d 444 (Ala. Ct. App. 1975).
30, See generally H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMESTc RELATIONS IN THE UNrrED
STATES 572 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CLARK]; Foster & Freed, Child Custody, supra
note 23; Shepherd, supra note 19, Justice Cardozo is credited with establishing the "best
interest" test in the United States. "He [the chancellor] acts as parens patriae to do
what is best for the interest of the child." Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148
N.E. 624, 626 (1925). Similar language, however, may be found in at least three earlier
cases. See United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (No. 15,256) (C.C.R.I. 1824)
("the real, permanent interests of the infant"); Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 465,
111 P. 21, 25 (1910) ("the interest and welfare of the child"); Chapsky v. Wood, 26
Kan. 650, 653, 40 Am. R. 321, 323 (1881) ("the welfare and interest of such child").
31. See Inker & Perretta, supra note 21, at 111.
32. See Shepherd, supra note 19, at 159.
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Yet the courts may justify their holdings by appeal to either
doctrine. To the extent that the judge has an interest in summary
proceedings, or denies the adversary character of the contested custody,
or believes that he or she may fairly represent the interests of the child,
the parens patriae rationale may be invoked and the "best interest" rule
relegated to a secondary role.
The "best interest" test has not adequately protected the welfare of
the child in another respect. It has spawned a panoply of vague and
conflicting standards designed to restrain the discretionary character of
the custody award.33 Each, moreover, is administered ex parte and fails
as a substitute for the individualized attention afforded by independent
counsel.
For example, many states provide for consideration of the child's
wishes when he or she is of sufficient maturity to express a reasoned
preference for one parent.34  Some commentators, however, have ques-
tioned whether the young person, caught in the midst of a battle for
possession, has the ability to make an objective selection. 3' The judge,
in any event, is not bound by the child's preference.
In addition, courts frequently award custody by comparing the
relative fitness of each parent.36 This procedure tends to subvert the
value of the "best interest" rule by shifting attention from the emotional
needs of the child to the comparative abilities of the adult parties to
assume the obligations of exclusive parent. 37  The custody decision
becomes little more than an election by process of elimination.38
As a final example, some courts make the award on the basis of
simplistic rules of thumb. Illustrations include the presumptions that
natural parents will care for the child more adequately than non-natural
parents and that mothers are better suited than fathers to raise a younger
child.39 Whatever the merits of these contentions, neither provides a
33. See generally Foster & Freed, Child Custody, supra note 23; Oster, Custody
Proceedings: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAMILY L. 21 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Oster].
34. See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 1396 (1965). California statute requires the
court to give due weight to the child's wishes if the child "is of sufficient age and capac-
ity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody." CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 4600 (West Supp. 1974).
35. See, e.g., Lefco, The Child as a Party in Interest in Custody Proceedings, 10
GA. S.B.J. 577, 582 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lefco].
36. See, e.g., Freed & Foster, The Shuffled Child, supra note 7, at 28; Oster, supra
note 33, at 29-37; Shepherd, supra note 19, at 162.
37. California has expressly repudiated the fitness rule and substituted the "best
interest" test for all custody determinations. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1975).
See also In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
38. See Inker & Perretta, supra note 21, at 111.
39. See Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern American Family Law, 2 J.
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focus on the needs of the particular minor which the "best interest' rule
requires. Most jurisdictions have recognized the impersonality of for-
mulistic decision making and have repealed the statutes which con-
ferred rights to custody.40 The rules have survived in practice, how-
ever, and a few courts still apply them without modification.41
A few states have attempted to improve the standards for award of
custody by enacting legislation which defines best interest in terms of the
child's psychological well-being. 42 The court must weigh alternative
placements according to a checklist of considerations. Each element of
the statutes speaks to a particular need of the child. The result is a link
between judicial practice and that line of sociological theory which has
found a negative correlation between divorce and normal child
growth.43 The so-called "psychological best interest" test is a guideline
44which has received limited application despite widespread acclaim.4.
Perhaps, as a consequence of dissatisfaction with present standards and
increased familiarity with sociological research, more states will redefine
best interest in psychological terms. As yet, experience with the test is
limited, and fair evaluation is not possible.
In sum, each of the present standards for award of divorce custody
endows the judge with broad discretionary powers.45 When time,
FAMmY L. 101, 102 (1962); Freed & Foster, The Shuffled Child, supra note 7, at 28;
Lefco, supra note 35, at 577.
40. See Shepherd, supra note 19, at 159.
41. See, e.g., Love v. Love, 533 P.2d 230 (Mont. 1974); Davidyan v. Davidyan,
230 Pa. Super. 599, 327 A.2d 145 (1974); Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 1975).
Contra, Brill v. Johnson, 293 Ala. 435, 304 So. 2d 595 (1974); Bigley v. Tibbs, 193
Neb. 4, 225 N.W.2d 27 (1975); DeForest v. DeForest, 223 N.W.2d 919 (N.D. 1975).
Several commentators have specifically attacked the arguments on which the "parental
rights" and "tender years" doctrines rely. See, e.g., Levine, Child Custody: Iowa Corn
and Avant Garde, 1 FAMmY L.Q. 9, (1967); Podell, Peck & First, Custody-To Which
Parent?, 56 MARQ. L. REv. 51, 56-57 n.23 & 61-63 (1972).
42. See, e.g., MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 722.23 (Supp. 1975-76).
43. See generally Watson, supra note 10.
44. The first mention of the "psychological best interest" test is found in an article
prepared with the aid of interviews with Anna Freud. See Note, Alternatives to 'Pa-
rental Right' in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J 151, 157
n.29 (1963). The idea received expanded consideration six years later in an article by
Watson. See Watson, supra note 10. The best known work on the topic, published four
years after Watson's study, failed to credit the pioneering discussion by the Yale student.
See GoLDsmwn, FREuD & SoLNrr, supra note 10.
45. "The absence of definite rules for custody cases gives the courts very broad
discretion. The standards applied in practice can only be discovered by studying the
individual decisions. Such a study reveals that, in reaching conclusions as to the best
interests of a child and as to parental fitness, courts consider criteria which, although
useful, are inadequate, in that they fail to force courts to consider essential factual, so-
cial, medical, and psychological information. Consequently, a judge may have nothing
but his common sense to guide him to a wise solution of a complex problem." Foster
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knowledge, and resources are adequate to the caseload, the child re-
ceives the attention to detail that his interests merit. When, as is more
common, dockets are crowded, training insufficient, and resources limit-
ed, the child's predicament does not receive the scrutiny which an
independent advocate could provide.
Despite the shortcomings common to present standards for award
of custody, the "best interest" doctrine would appear to be the most
valuable guiding principle for placement determinations. It requires the
greatest concentration on the welfare of the child and demands appraisal
of custody alternatives from the minor's perspective.
Current Procedures for the Award of Divorce Custody
Representation by Counsel for the Adult Parties
Many of the current procedures which courts employ to settle
custody disputes likewise fail to place in proper perspective the impact
of divorce on the child. Chief among these is advocacy of the child's
best interest by counsel for the parents. Commentators have discredited
any presumption that the minor may be fairly represented by an adult
party or by counsel for such a party.4 6 A child, they urge, has interests
at stake which differ from those of a parent. Examples include the
interests in an environment suited to normal psychological growth and
in custody by a party capable of assuming the obligations of child
rearing. Furthermore, adherence to the "best interest" rule requires
counsel for the parents to analyze prejudicial and conflicting evidence
from the perspective of the minor. On the other hand, counsel have a
duty under the Code of Professional Responsibility to interpret that
same evidence in the light most favorable to their clients.4" When
testimony impugns fitness, counsel is obligated to provide a refutation,
even though he may not believe that his client is a suitable custodian.
Clearly, this dual role for counsel involves conflicting interests which
work against full advocacy of the child's needs.
Representation by Guardian Ad Litem
A few states have attempted to resolve the problems of representa-
tion by the parents' counsel through appointment of guardians ad litem
& Freed, Child Custody, supra note 23, at 438 (footnote omitted). See also Oster, supra
note 33, at 23-25; Shepherd, supra note 19, at 161; Note, Measuring the Child's Best
Interests-A Study of Incomplete Considerations, 44 DENVER L.J. 132 (1967).
46. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 10, at 67; Foster & Freed,
A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 343, 356 (1972); Freed & Foster, The
Shuffled Child, supra note 7, at 34; Hansen, Rights of Children, supra note 3, at 8; Inker
& Perretta, supra note 21; Lefco, supra note 35, at 580-81.
47. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1, 7-1.
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to speak for the interests of the child.48 Typically, the laws provide for
appointment in cases of contested custody or at the discretion of the
judge. In jurisdictions which lack statutory authority for the appoint-
ment, the court may rely on its inherent rule making power.
The provision for a guardian is a significant, partial advancement
toward protection of the child's welfare. In Kentucky and Wisconsin,
the appointee has rights of examination and cross-examination equiva-
lent to those of full counsel.49 Some states require the guardian to be a
licensed attorney.50 Nevertheless, the guardian does not enjoy all the
rights of counsel for the adult parties. For example, he may not
participate in the negotiations for alimony and property distribution,
and he does not always have independent powers of discovery. As a
consequence, the appointed guardian cannot adequately represent the
child, since he has neither equal access to information nor an equal right
to participate in crucial aspects of the divorce proceedings. He plays a
more passive role than would an independent attorney. The guardian
system, therefore, cannot ensure that a decree will satisfy the "best
interest" rule.
Investigation by a Social Services Department
Many judges now seek the advice of local social service or analo-
gous court departments regarding custody alternatives.51 The desired
goal is an analysis of alternative awards in terms of the "psychological
best interest" test discussed above. 52 Court and counsel can thereby tap
the expertise of those outside their field of competence. The assump-
tion is that a mix of legal and sociological opinions will produce greater
likelihood of a decision which meets the concerns of the child, the
parents, and the state.
The reports, however, cannot remedy the absence of independent
representation for the child. The social worker who reviews the place-
ment alternatives is not an advocate. He neither hears the parents'
48. Wisconsin's experience has been discussed by a number of commentators. See
Hansen, Guardians Ad Litem in Divorce and Custody Cases: Protection of the Child's
Interests, 4 J. FAMILY L. 181 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hansen, Guardians Ad Litem];
Hansen, Rights of Children, supra note 3; PodelI, The "Why" Behind Appointing
Guardians Ad Litem for Children in Divorce Proceedings, 57 MARQ. L REV. 103
(1973) hereinafter cited as Podell]; Speca & Wehrman, Protecting the Rights of
Children in Divorce Cases in Missouri, 38 U. Mo. KAN. CrTY L. REv. 1 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Speca & Wehrman].
49. See Hansen, Guardians Ad Litem, supra note 48; Hansen, Rights of Children,
supra note 3; Podell, supra note 48; Speca & Wehrman, supra note 48.
50. For example, in Kentucky, which terms its guardians "Friends of the Court,"
the friend must be an attorney. Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 403.090 (Supp. 1974).
51. See CLARK, supra note 30, at 398.
52. See notes 42-44 & accompanying text supra.
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arguments nor rebuts testimony. Several observers have warned that
social service investigations are subjective by nature and merely add to
the conflicting testimony which the court, counsel, and guardian must
interpret. 53  At least one psychologist has noted the high costs involved
and recommends that a court forego the investigation altogether when
resources are insufficient for an exhaustive inquiry."
Notice to a Public Official
Finally, about half the states require that a public official receive
notice of any divorce which involves children below a specified age. 55
The provision ensures an opportunity for a representative of the state to
appear and to certify that a custody award satisfies the public interest. In
Wisconsin, the official of the state in the uncontested case is the Family
Court Commissioner, who enjoys the "same rights and opportunities as
counsel for the parties." 50  He may, for instance, take depositions and
compel the attendance of witnesses. 57 Nevertheless, the procedure suf-
fers from drawbacks similar to those of the guardian system. The
representative need not be a lawyer and may lack the ability to skillfully
attack the arguments of counsel for the parents. His or her essential
function is to review the arrangements for custody from the perspective
of the public interest, not that of the child.
The Consequences of Inadequate Procedures
Thus, except in the few states which require participation of a
guardian ad litem 8 or attorney59 for the child, the court acts alone to
determine whether a custody award satisfies the "best interest" rule. The
potential shortcomings of this procedure are numerous. First, the judge
assumes conflicting functions as advocate and impartial arbiter.60 The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has recognized the inefficiency of represen-
tation by a judge alone. In a recent decision, it held that failure to
appoint a guardian to aid in the determination of an award responsive to
53. See, e.g., Lefco, supra note 35, at 579-80.
54. Watson, supra note 10, at 76.
55. See CLARK, supra note 30, at 380-81; Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for
Children, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 343 (1972).
56. Hansen, Guardians Ad Litem, supra note 48, at 182.
57. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 252.15 (1971).
58. See note 2 supra.
59. Id.
60. "Where the rights of children of the divorcing parties are involved, it is not
enough to assign the responsibility for speaking up for the children to the parents; their
perspective is often clouded by the hostility existing between them, or to the judge, har-
assed by the pressures of time and serving as the umpire not as an advocate." Hansen,
Rights of Children, supra note 3, at 7-8 (footnote omitted).
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the child's welfare was a partial ground for reversal."' Similarly, the
Oregon Court of Appeals has found that potential conflicts exist among
the interests of children, parents, and the state in all termination pro-
ceedings and has held that'the judge must appoint independent counsel
to represent the needs of the minor.62 Second, crowded calendars and
limited time for reflection foster a rubber stamp approach to agreements
reached by counsel for the adult parties.63 Third, the majority of judges
do not understand the dynamics of child development.6" They frame
decrees in moralistic terms which demonstrate an ignorance of social
science research that could be of value in weighing custody alternatives.
The objective appraisal of the child's welfare which the "best interest"
rule theoretically requires -has become no more than an abstract goal for
most courts.
To the extent that standards and procedures are inadequate, the
child becomes a pawn in a dispute which may affect his financial and
psychological well-being.65 No judge would admit to treatment of the
minor as a chattel. 6  Yet when the court accepts the settlement of the
parties as binding on the child or withholds from him the safeguards
afforded parents, the child enjoys all the rights of the family car.
Proposed Changes in the Guiding Principles and
Procedures for Award of Divorce Custody
Overview
To remedy the deficiencies of existing law, observers have pro-
posed numerous new standards and procedures. These proposals in-
clude many suggestions short of separate counsel: better representation
by the attorneys for the adult parties;67 minimal modification of custody
61. Mawhinney v. Mawhinney, 66 Wis. 2d 679, 225 N.W.2d 501 (1975).
62. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah County v. Wade, 527 P.2d 753, 757
(Ore. Ct. App. 1974).
63. See note 3 & accompanying text supra.
64. See Watson, supra note 10, at 61-62.
65. See MacDonald, A Case for Independent Counsel to Represent Children in
Custody Proceedings, 7 NEw ENGL. L. REv. 351, 358 (1971); Shepherd, supra note 19,
at 178.
66. Hansen, Rights of Children, supra note 3, at 1.
67.. See, e.g., Fain, The Role and Responsibility of the Lawyer in Custody Cases,
1 FAMILY L.Q. 3, 36 (1967); Isaac, Family Law and the Lawyer, 2 J. FAMILY L. 43
(1962); Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family
Court, 12 BUFFALO L. REv. 501 (1963); Philips, Mental Hygiene, Divorce and the Law,
3 J. FAMILY L. 63 (1963); Polow, The Lawyer in the Adoption Process, 6 FAMILY L.Q.
72 (1972); Speca & Wehrman, supra note 48; Watson, The Lawyer as Counsellor, 5 J.
FAMILY L. 7 (1965).
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decrees;6 8 greater resort to expert advice;69 parental counseling to avoid
unnecessary divorce; 7° appointment of committees of doctors, educators,
and clergymen to review decrees;71 holding argument in chambers
rather than in open court; 72 and creation of a system of family courts to
integrate delinquency, neglect, dependency, adoption, and divorce cus-
tody cases into one judicial setting.78
Each of these suggestions would effect a more exacting considera-
tion of the child's welfare. Nevertheless, none of the changes would
guarantee forceful representation of the child's interests. Counsel for
the adult parties would remain obligated to advocate their clients' needs
over those of the child in the event of a conflict. The judge would still
have to compromise his role as spokesman for the child under the "best
interest" rule in order to render an impartial decision. Each proposal
would, therefore, perpetuate the major deficiencies of existing schemes.
Proposals for Separate Counsel--On Grounds
Other than the Due Process Clause
Advocates of separate counsel have proposed at least three argu-
ments based on grounds which make no appeal to constitutional guaran-
tees.
The first relies on the language of joinder and intervention statutes
to claim that the child has interests at stake which cannot be protected
unless he participates in the proceeding. 74  For example, under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may declare a person
indispensible to an action if -he claims an interest relating to the subject
of the action and may lose the ability to protect that interest unless
granted party status.75 If the absence will prejudice the interest in a
68. The advocates of a limited right to modification argue that a child requires
a stable home environment for normal psychological development. They contend that
statutes which facilitate changes in placement weaken a custodian's commitment to a
child and threaten the desired stability of the family unit. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, FREUD
& SOLNIT, supra note 10, at 35; Bodenheimer, supra note 13, at 728-29; Kay & Philips,
Poverty and the Law of Child Custody, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 717, 722 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Kay & Philips]; Watson, supra note 10, at 63-64.
69. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 30, at 398-99; Bodenheimer, supra note 13, at 722;
Foster & Freed, Child Custody, supra note 23, at 615-20; Kay & Philips, supra note 68,
at 724-25, 740; Watson, supra note 10, at 74-75.
70. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, supra note 13, at 722; Kay & Philips, supra note 68,
at 740; Watson, supra note 10, at 74-75.
71. See, e.g., Kubie, Provision for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents:
A New Legal Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197 (1964); Watson, supra note 10 at 67, 79.
72. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 10, at 78.
73. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, supra note 13, at 729; Shepherd, supra note 19, at 171
& n.85.
74. See Kleinfeld, supra note 4, at 324-27.
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2).
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manner which cannot be corrected by shaping the relief among the
parties, the case may be dismissed for nonjoinder.7 6 In those instances
in which a person is not a necessary and indispensible party, he may still
have a right to intervene if his absence will impair his ability to protect
an interest relating to the subject of the action, unless that interest is
adequately represented by existing parties. 77  The language of these
statutes does not bar their applicability to minors. Nonetheless, oppo-
nents of the joinder and intervention arguments may cite ample authori-
ty for the proposition that children need not receive the same procedural
protections afforded adults.71 Moreover, in divorce custody actions
specifically, joinder and intervention arguments have simply not per-
suaded courts to offer party status to minors. 79
The second argument avoids discussion of the procedural means
for representation of the minor and contends solely that the child's
interests in an environment conducive to normal psyohological develop-
ment are so important that their protection should not be entrusted to
the court and adult parties alone.8 0 The success of this approach,
however, requires a judge to recognize the inviolability of human needs
which cannot be measured. Not surprisingly, the "normal growth"
approach has been accepted by few courts.8 ' One explanation lies in
the courts' lack of familiarlity with the contributions of the social
sciences concerning the mechanics of divorce and child growth. Another
may rest solely on tradition, which sanctions awards based on paren-
tal fitness and token reference to the "best interest" rule.8 2
76. FED R. Civ. P. 19(b).
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). "The right to intervene belongs to anyone who
'would be substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination made in the
action,' not merely those with rights in a fund to be distributed or those whom the pro-
ceeding might bind as a matter of res judicata, and representation is inadequate under
the rule even though a party has a legal duty to represent the would-be intervenor where
it probably will be inadequate as a practical matter." Kleinfeld, supra note 4, at 326
(footnote omitted).
78. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). But see Pintek v.
Superior Ct., 78 Ariz. 179, 277 P.2d 265 (1954).
79. Kleinfeld, supra note 4, at 327.
80. See GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNrr, supra note 10, at 65-66.
81. Only a few cases have cited the Goldstein analysis with approval. See, e.g.,
DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919 (N.D. 1975).
82. "Despite strong reasons to the contrary, most jurisdictions award custody with-
out any representation of the child. Only a little authority can be found for the proposi-
tion that a child is not a necessary party, or even a permissible intervenor, but nearly
all jurisdictions conduct custody proceedings as if that were so. This practice may be
not so much a reasoned decision as an historical survival from the period where custody
decisions were made upon the basis of parental right rather than best interests of the
child, so that the child had no recognized interest to be represented." Kleinfeld, supra
note 4, at 336-37 (footnotes omitted).
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A third argument for separate counsel draws upon analogies be-
tween the custody proceeding and actions in which minors presently
enjoy independent standing to justify the use of identical procedural
safeguards in the custody context.83 For example, some courts have
extended the right to seek medical treatment without parental consent to
children below the age of majority.84 Counsel is often provided the
minor in neglect,8 5 probate,88 and personal injury" actions. For the
juvenile delinquent, the right to independent representation is constitu-
tionally guaranteed.88
The similarities between the divorce custody proceeding and the
situations above appear close at first glance. A probate decision, for
example, -has an impact on the financial well-being of the child similar
to that of an alimony or property settlement. Each affects purchasing
power for food, clothing, housing, and schooling. Likewise, juvenile
court dispositions and divorce custody awards serve a common goal, the
normal socialization of the child.
Nonetheless, some similarity of consequence and purpose by itself
seldom justifies similarity of procedure. The logic of the arguments by
analogy fails to consider that the rights which minors exert in the
analogous proceedings have distinct legal histories. The right to coun-
sel in juvenile court derives from similarities between juvenile court and
criminal proceedings. It is because of this similarity that "essentials of
due process and fair treatment '8 9 have been said to require that counsel
be provided in juvenile court proceedings. The provision for represen-
tation in the probate action has deep roots in the common law." A
delinquent is a defendant in an action brought by the state in response to
an accomplished harm. An heir is the recipient of a direct interest in
land or chattels. The child of divorce, by contrast, has neither commit-
ted a wrong nor acquired a legal claim to the assets of his parents.
The Constitutional Argument
Introduction
The most persuasive argument for the child's right to counsel in
divorce custody proceedings is based on notions of constitutional law.
This section presents the idea that the protections afforded by the due
83. See id. at 326-27.
84. Cf. Younts v. St. Francis Hosp., 205 Kan. 292, 469 P.2d 330 (1970).
85. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 249 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
86. See Kleinfeld, supra note 4, at 340-41.
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
89. Id. at 30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
90. See Kleinfeld, supra note 4, at 340-41.
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment should be held to include
an unqualified right to independent counsel for the child of divorcing
parents. 91 The discussion will outline the tests for applicability and
scope of due process guarantees and then develop the rationale for
separate representation.
At the outset, two potential objections to the constitutional argu-
ment require mention. The first is that the word "person," as used in
the fourteenth amendment, does not include minors. The answer is
certain. Under a line of cases which is numerically short but unmistak-
ably clear, the Supreme Court has established the minor as a "person"
under both the fifth and the fourteenth amendments. 92
The second objection is that there is insufficient conflict among the
interests of the child, adult and the state to claim the existence of a case
or controversy arising under the constitution or federal law.93 Natural-
ly, if the welfare of the minor were construed to be adequately protected
by the court or the parents, the argument for separate counsel would be
considered superfluous. The Supreme Court has not stated explicitly
the degree of conflict of interest necessary to constitute a case or
controversy, but the possibility of dismissal for absence of a dispute is
not remote. Justice Powell objected to the recent extension of due
process protections to public school students subject to disciplinary
91. This argument for separate counsel views denial of independent representation
as an infringement of rights guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See note 5 supra. Some of the reasoning involved, however, draws upon
the non-due process arguments discussed earlier. The constitutional argument draws
analogies between the divorce custody situation and cases in which children enjoy proce-
dural protections greater than in divorce custody cases but in which the deprivations of
liberty or property are similar. It stresses the child's need to grow in a stable environ-
ment and the importance of equal standing with the adult parties. To some extent,
therefore, this newest of approaches must share the weaknesses of logic not based
upon notions of procedural due process. A constitutional argument, however, has
a distinct advantage over all others. It may draw from an increasingly large body of
Supreme Court decisions regarding the legal status of minors under the fourteenth
amendment, and it may appeal to a long line of cases establishing elaborate protections
against invasions of fundamental interests.
92. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Gallegos
v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948); West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943). Fifth amendment cases
are included here because analysis of due process safeguards is identical under the two
amendments.
The Supreme Court has recently held that "the word 'person,' as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, does not include the unborn." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158
(1972) (footnote omitted).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
March 1976] CHILD'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
action partially on the ground that the interests of pupil and administra-
tor are not at odds.94 Furthermore, argument for the separability of the
interests of the child in divorce proceedings is a recent phenomenon and
not widely respected.9 5
On the other hand, the list of disputes which have been found
cognizable under the due process clause does not preclude the addition
of safeguards for the children of divorce.96 Moreover, Justice Black
noted in dictum in a 1962 opinion that determination of custody is not
necessarily a question which parents can objectively resolve." None-
theless, until the literature which has stressed the separate interests of
the child gains greater respect, opponents of independent representation
will continue to deny the existence of a justiciable conflict.
The Tests for Applicability of Due Process
The Nature of ihe Interest
The test for applicability of the due process clause consists of two
parts. The first concerns the nature of the interest at stake, while the
second considers the gravity of its deprivation.98
Despite authority to the contrary discussed below, the most recent
decisions of the Supreme Court have afforded protection for only the
interests denominated in the fourteenth amendment-liberty and prop-
erty.99  For example, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Board
94. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 591 (1975) (dissenting opinion).
95. See note 82 & accompanying text supra.
96. The list of conflicts which have been found cognizable under the due process
clause is not confined to disputes between adults or to criminal cases. Cf. Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (public school administration and student); Wolff v. Mc-
Donnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (warden and prisoner); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S.
600 (1974) (debtor and creditor); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (public em-
ployer and employee); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole officer and
parolee); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (public school administration
and teacher); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (debtor and creditor); Bell v. Bur-
son, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (motor vehicle department and licensed driver); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare administrator and recipient); Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (debtor and creditor); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(state and juvenile delinquent).
97. "Unfortunately, experience has shown that the question of custody, so vital to
a child's happiness and well-being, frequently cannot be left to the discretion of parents.
This is particularly true where, as here, the estrangement of husband and wife beclouds
parental judgment with emotion and prejudice." Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193
(1962).
98. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972).
99. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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of Regents v. Roth,100 specified that "while the Court has eschewed rigid
or formulistic limitations on the protection of procedural due process, it
has at the same time observed certain boundaries. For the words
'liberty' and 'property' . . . must be given some meaning."''1  The
Court in Roth upheld nonretention, without an explanation or a hearing,
of a nontenured teacher at a state university. The apparent restriction is
flexible, however, since the Court neither overruled nor distinguished
earlier holdings which placed broader interpretations on the scope of
due process guarantees. °2
Rather than addressing these prior decisions directly, the Court in
Roth proposed definitions for "liberty" and "property." The bounds of
liberty were outlined by reference to the language of several previous
decisions. The result was a collage of generalizations describing liberty
as extending beyond freedom from bodily restraint °3 and from "the sort
of formal constraints imposed by the criminal process"'1 4 to matters of
reputation, honor, and integrity'0 5 and to "those privileges long recog-
nized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free-
men."'106 One might argue that as a result of so broad a declaration, the
bounds of liberty remain illusory.
The interest in property, however, received a more exacting consid-
eration. The Court specified that it would be willing to extend proce-
dural protections only to "safeguard. . . the security of interests that a
person has already acquired in specific benefits.' 07  It held that the
dimensions of suoh interests were to be derived not from the language of
the Constitution but from "existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law . . .. ,, Finally, the
Court held that "[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must
have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it."' 0 9
While Roth treated property interests as creatures of state law or of
other sources independent of the Constitution, it placed no similar
restrictions on the interest in liberty. The distinction, of course, does
not prevent a court from borrowing statutory definitions of liberty. In
100. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
101. Id. at 572.
102. See notes 113-23 & accompanying text infra.
103. 408 U.S. at 572.
104. Id. at 572 (footnote omitted).
105. Id. at 573, quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
106. Id. at 572, quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
107. 408 U.S. at 576.
108. Id. at 577.
109. Id.
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Wolff v. McDonnell,"' for example, the Court reviewed a Nebraska
policy of revoking prisoners' good-time benefits without prior hearing.
The Court recognized that the Constitution does not guarantee credit for
satisfactory behavior but added that nonetheless,
the State having created the right to good time and itself recogniz-
ing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major miscon-
duct, the prisoner's interest has real substance and is sufficiently
embraced within Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" to entitle him
to those minimum procedures . . . required by the Due Process
Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abro-
gated."'
While the Court thus invoked the due process clause to affirm the
statutory right, it by no means indicated that protection would be
extended only to "liberty" as defined by statute.
Furthermore, as mentioned above," 2 the Supreme Court has not
always determined the applicability of the due process clause by restrict-
ing itself to the precise language of the fourteenth amendment. In
Goldberg v. Kelly, 3 the Court held that termination of public assist-
ance payments without an opportunity for a prior evidentiary hearing
denied procedural due process. The Court required no showing of a
controversy involving a denominated interest. A single reference to
welfare as a modem form of property was placed in a footnote."14 The
opinion simply concluded that "[s]uch benefits are a matter of statutory
entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination
involves state action that adjudicates important rights.""' 5
In Bell v. Burson,"6 the Court considered whether failure to afford
a hearing on the question of fault or liability before suspension of a
motor vehicle driver's license constituted a denial of due process. Find-
ing in the affirmative, it held that "[o]nce licenses are issued . . . their
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.
Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates
important interests of the licensees.""' 7
Two months before the decision in Roth, the Court again displayed
no inclination to hold to the specific language of the due process clause,
110. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
111. Id. at 557.
112. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
113. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
114. Id. at 262 n.8. The Roth opinion construed Goldberg as involving the in-
fringement of property rights. 408 U.S. at 576. The Supreme Court, however, did not
squarely set the Goldberg decision on the ground of a property deprivation. See text
accompanying note 113 supra.
115. 397 U.S. at 262 (emphasis added).
116. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
117. Id. at 539 (emphasis added).
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as it found, in Stanley v. Illinois,118 that a state may not presume that
unmarried fathers are unsuited as parents and neglectful of their chil-
dren. An Illinois statute required the state, upon the death of the
mother, to take custody of all illegitimate children, without a hearing on
the father's fitness. The interest at issue was described variously as
"that of a man in the children he has sired and raised 119 and that "in
retaining custody."'120
These decisions and others caused one observer to write that
[tihe frequent practice of... referring to a denial of due process,
without any reference to anything else that a person has been de-
prived of in terms of the language of the Fourteenth Amendment,
prompts the question whether the Court now reads the language
of the Amendment as if it said, "* * * nor shall any state deprive
any person of due process of law.' 2 '
Roth and subsequent decisions have provided an answer to the contrary,
but they have left unclear the bounds of the interests protected by the
due process clause.' 22  Whether or not the Court would currently reject
an argument based solely on the deprivation of an important right or
important interest remains moot, however, since there is nothing in the
recent opinions to indicate a repudiation of the earlier line of reason-
ing.
1 23
The Gravity of the Deprivation
The second part of the test for applicability of procedural due
process measures the gravity of the deprivation of the protected interest.
Supreme Court opinions demonstrate a split of authority regarding this
prong of the test comparable to that concerning the range of protected
rights.
The older view, announced by Justice Frankfurter in a concurring
opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, s4 requires a
demonstration of "grievous loss' ' 125 to invoke due process guarantees. In
118. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
119. Id. at 651.
120. Id. at 652.
121. O.L. BROWDER, JR., R.A. CUNNINGHAM & J.R. JULIN, BASIC PROPERTY LAW
104 (2d ed. 1973).
122. In a number of decisions due process protections have been limited to the in-
terests denominated in the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 572-76 (1975).
123. Under either line, however, the requirement that the right or interest be state-
created would still apply.
124. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
125. "This Court is not alone in recognizing that the rights to be heard before being
condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma
and hardship of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society." Id. at 168
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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McGrath, the Court heard a challenge to an executive order which had
required the attorney general to prepare a list of communist organiza-
tions for use in identifying disloyal government employees for discipline.
The list named the Anti-Fascist Committee, which argued, in part, that
its inclusion without notice or hearing violated the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. The organization's allegations of loss of operating
revenue and harm to reputation persuaded the majority that the peti-
tioner had stated a claim for which relief could be granted. The Court
has applied the "grievous loss" standard on many subsequent occasions
to analyze deprivations of liberty'26 and "important"'127 interests.
An opposing view has emerged, however, which requires no more
than a de minimis deprivation of a protected interest to invoke the due
process clause. Justice Harlan formulated the test in a concurring
opinion in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,28 in which the Court
invalidated a Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute for failure to
provide adequate notice and hearing for the garnishee. 129 Justice Har-
lan's opinion offered no elaboration of the rule, stating only that
"[s]ince this deprivation cannot be characterized as de minimis,
[petitioner] must be accorded the usual requisites of procedural due
process ... ."Ixo Three years later, a majority cited the test with
approval in a footnote to Fuentes v. Shevin,"' in which the Court
invalidated a Florida prejudgment replevin statute on grounds similar to
those in Sniadach. Not until Goss v. Lopez,"12 however, did the rule
assume prominence in the analysis of the applicability of the due process
clause. Justice White declared in Goss that "as long as a property
deprivation is not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question
whether account must be taken of the Due Process Clause."' 3
Although no opinion has repudiated the "grievous loss" rule, the
Court appears to have chosen the "de minimis" test as the more appro-
priate standard. The "de minimis" test accords with a modem shift
toward focus on the nature of the interest at stake, not on its weight,
when determining whether or not due process safeguards should apply.
For instance, in Fuentes, the Court held that while the "severity of a
deprivation may be another factor to weigh in determining the appropri-
126. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
127. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). See also note 114
supra. The opinion in Goldberg misconstrued the test inasmuch as the Court applied
it to an analysis of how much due process to afford, not whether to extend due process
at all.
128. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
129. Id. at 342.
130. Id.
131. 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.21 (1972).
132. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
133. Id. at 576 (citations omitted).
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ate form of hearing, it is not decisive of the basic right to a prior hearing
of some kind." 134  The majority in Roth echoed this language, stating
that "to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first
place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at
stake."' 35  The Court in Goss employed identical logic. 136  In short,
although the test for applicability of due process includes considerations
of both the nature of the interest infringed and the extent of its depriva-
tion, the Court will safeguard all rights which it holds to be included
within the due process clause on a showing of some damage. The
weight of the loss will figure more prominently in the determination of
which particular protections to afford.
Although the "de minimis" rule emerged from a line of property
cases, the Court has used the standard for measuring deprivations of
liberty, as well. For example, Goss involved not only the property
interest in continued public education but also the liberty interest in a
reputation free from the stigma of expulsion from school. The Court
specifically applied the "de minimis" rule to each.'37
The Test for the Scope of Due Process Protection
Once the applicability of the due process clause is established,
analysis must turn to the degree of protection to which an individual is
entitled.' 8 In this determination, the Supreme Court has long empha-
sized procedural flexibility.' 39 The protections due in a given situation
derive from a balance of the competing interests.' 40
The foundational requisites of procedural due process are some
form of notice and opportunity to be heard.' 41  These rights apply
134. 407 U.S. at 86.
135. 408 U.S. at 570-71 (citations omitted).
136. 419 U.S. at 575-76.
137. Id. at 576.
138. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
139. "The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
140. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. Mc-
Elroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
Federal court decisions and law review articles which have attempted to isolate
fixed ingredients of the balancing process would therefore appear to contravene the clear
intent of Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v.
Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 1974); Thompson v. Wash-
ington, 497 F.2d 626, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Note, Procedural Due Process in Govern-
ment-Subsidized Housing, 86 HAv. L. Rnv. 880, 891 (1973).
141. See, e.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Baldwin v. Hale, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1864).
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irrespective of the cost'42 or efficiency' 4 ' of implementation and regard-
less of the type of interest allegedly infringed."' The timing and
substance of each, however, depends upon the nature of the case."'
When the Supreme Court has found that the interests of the individual
outweigh those of the state, it has provided a hearing prior to or
contemporaneous with the deprivation of a protected right. 46 When
the interests of the state have predominated, the hearing has followed
the deprivation.
14 7
Representation is not a foundational requisite of due process;148 the
Court has chosen to analyze the question of the right to counsel on a
case-by-case basis. 149  Therefore, the type of interest allegedly in-
fringed, 5 ° cost,'' efficiency,"' and whether the attorney would be ap-
pointed or retained' 5 ' are material factors in determining whether to
provide counsel at all.
For instance, in Goldberg v. Kelly,' the Court held that a welfare
recipient faced with revocation of assistance benefits may retain an
attorney if representation is desired.155 The state's interest in an inex-
pensive, summary proceeding, however, outweighed a right to appointed
142. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971).
143. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
144. Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (property) and Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (property) with Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974) (liberty) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (liberty).
145. Goss v. Lopez, 419, U.S. 565, 579 (1975).
146. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
147. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
148. There may be an argument to the contrary supported by cases which require
representation at least when a party is illiterate or does not understand the nature of
the proceeding. In Wolff v. McDonnell, for example, the Court stated: "Where an illit-
erate inmate is involved, however, or where the complexity of the issue makes it unlikely
that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate
comprehension of the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or if
that is forbidden, to have adequate substitute aid in the form of help from the staff or
from a sufficiently competent inmate designated by the staff." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 570 (1974). See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
149. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
150. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 178 n.6 (1974) (White, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
151. S"e, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973).
152. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974).
153. "We do not say that counsel must be provided at the pre-termination hearing,
but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires." Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 270.
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representation. 56  In Goss v. Lopez,157 by contrast, the Court denied
that a student subject to short suspension from public school has a right
to retain counsel.'58 The denial was based on the notion that creation
of a trial atmosphere might "overwhelm administrative facilities"'5 9 and
destroy the effectiveness of suspension as part of the teaching process. 60
Nonetheless, consistent with the flexibility of a balancing process,
the Court did not categorically deny representation for all suspensions.
It acknowledged, for example, that public school administrators may
permit counsel in cases involving longer suspensions or more difficult
fact situations than those analyzed in Goss.'6'
The Proposed Constitutional Argument for
Separate Representation of the Child
The preceding analysis of the applicability and scope of procedural
due process provides a framework for argument supporting a child's
right to separate counsel in divorce custody proceedings. Discussion
will identify the interests of the minor which may be infringed, measure
the gravity of their deprivation, and balance their weight against the
opposing interests of the state.
The Child's Separate Interests in Divorce Custody Proceedings
Liberty Interests
As stated earlier, the child of divorce has an interest in an award
conducive to healthy emotional development. 6 Proponents of change
in divorce custody procedure have resorted to two principal sources of
authority to indicate that the child has separate interests in divorce
custody proceedings.' 63 First, by reference to sociological literature,
they have emphasized the need to consider psychological variables when
evaluating placement alternatives. In addition, they have cited Supreme
Court cases acknowledging a clear public policy in favor of protecting
156. Id.
157. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
158. Id. at 583.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 419 U.S. at 584. For parole and probation revocation hearings, the court has
established a limited right to counsel. It has explained that "[a]lthough the presence
and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally un-
necessary in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain cases in which funda-
mental fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require that the State provide at
its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
162. See note 80 & accompanying text supra.
163. See notes 42-44 & accompanying text supra.
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the stability of the family unit.' The Court -has established both that
this interest in a stable family unit applies to the child and that it is part
of the concept of "liberty." For example, it has stated that "[i]t is the
interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be
both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into
free and independent well-developed men and citizens."'1 65
The liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment clearly includes
the child's interest in normal growth as well as his interest in a stable
family unit. In the Roth opinion, which remains the most ambitious
recent attempt to define the scope of due process liberty, 166 the Court
stressed the importance of a flexible definition. It described the concept
as "purposely left to gather meaning from experience . . .,1*" and as
"relat[ing] to the whole domain of social and economic fact . . ".68
Furthermore, protection of the child's interests in the divorce proceeding
does not require an attenuated definition or analysis. The need for
family stability is already a recognized ingredient of fourteenth amend-
ment liberty. 6 9 The interest in normal growth is simply a logical
corollary of that need. Obviously, if the state sanctions custody proce-
dures which fail to consider the emotional well-being of the children
involved, it also sanctions a disregard of family unity.17 0
"Important" Interests
These interests in fourteenth amendment liberty also qualify as
"important" interests under the authority of the pre-Roth cases which
extended due process safeguards to rights not specifically denominated
"liberty" or "property."' 17' For instance, in Stanley v. Illinois,172 the
Court recognized a right to the management of one's children"' and,
therefore, invalidated a statutory presumption that unmarried fathers
were unsuited to assume the obligations of custody upon the death of the
mother. 74  The opinion, however, did not analyze the parent's rights
alone; it also acknowledged that the fitness of an adult for parenthood
has a significant bearing upon the growth and development of a child. 175
164. See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
165. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
166. 408 U.S. at 572-75.
167. Id. at 571, quoting National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582,
646 (1949).
168. Id.
169. See notes 19, 164 & accompanying text supra.
170. See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
171. See notes 113-23 & accompanying text supra.
172. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
173. See notes 119-20 & accompanying text supra.
174. 405 U.S. at 657-58.
175. Id. at 652-53.
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The Court therefore understood the placement award to affect separate
concerns of minor and adult.17 6  The opinion stated that when "the
procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care
. . .it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests
of both parent and child."1"7  Since the Court has not discredited the
logic of cases which applied due process protections to non-denominated
interests, Stanley remains valuable support for a distinction between the
needs of children and those of parents in divorce custody proceedings.
Property Interests
By comparison to the liberty interests and other "important" inter-
ests discussed above, the property rights of the child in divorce custody
proceedings have little substance. Roth requires proof of entitlement to
a benefit before due process will apply.'7 8  In the absence of a clear
statutory 179 or de facto' state policy which allows direct participation
of the child in the distribution of marital assets, the alleged property
claim constitutes merely a "unilateral expectation"' 8 ' or "abstract
need."' 8 2  Therefore, argument that divorce infringes a minor's eco-
nomic well-being will not of itself invoke the protections of the four-
teenth amendment. 83
176. Justice Douglas emphasized the need to weigh the interests of the minor in
litigation concerning the parental right to control the religious freedom of a child. Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (dissenting opinion). "If the parents . . . are
allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable effect is to impose the parents' notions of
religious duty upon their children. Where the child is mature enough to express poten-
tially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an
imposition without canvassing his views." Id. at 242.
177. Id. at 657 (emphasis added).
178. 408 U.S. at 577.
179. Id.
180. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 600 (1972).
181. 408 U.S. at 577.
182. Id.
183. A few recent Supreme Court decisions have greatly expanded the scope of pro-
tections afforded by the fourteenth amendment. These cases have found "zones of pri-
vacy" emanating from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights which encompass a
married couple's right to use contraceptives and a pregnant woman's qualified right to
seek abortion free of state interference. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abor-
tion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraceptives). Whether the
logic of these opinions will support a broad interest in personal autonomy remains an
open question. Several lower courts, however, have already construed Roe as resting
the abortion decision with the pregnant woman and her physician alone. Statutes re-
quiring parental consent for abortions performed on pregnant minors have therefore
been invalidated. See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975); Planned Parent-
hood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F.
Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975).
Further mention of these emergent interests would require discussion of the special
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The Gravity of Deprivation of the Child's Separate Interests
The "De Minimis" Standard
The gravity of the deprivation of the child's protected interests in
divorce custody is not de minimis. Cases which have defined the
standard have at the same time emphasized a shift from measuring the
weight of the loss toward scrutinizing the nature of the right allegedly
infringed."' For example, in Goss, the Court held that once a de
minimis infringement is found, the gravity of deprivation is irrelevant to
the question of whether due process may apply in a given situation. 8 5
There, a ten-day suspension from public school was sufficient to
infringe due process liberty on grounds of potential damage to reputa-
tion. 18
6
By comparison to the public school suspension, the custody deci-
sion threatens harm which clearly satisfies the "de minimis" rule. The
placement award is permanent, not temporary. It ruptures the stability
of the family unit"' and poses a threat to the child's normal growth and
devlopment. 18 8  The stigma which may attach to a ten-day school
absence is minor by comparison to the long-term hardships which may
result from an ill-considered placement.
The "Grievous Loss" Standard
If the Supreme Court were to return to a measure of deprivation
based upon the grievous loss standard, the interests of the child would
qualify for protection nonetheless. Divorce, as mentioned above,' 89
may tend to disrupt the normal socialization of the child. An earlier
section of this note, for example, outlined the potential consequences of
a failure to consider the psychological best interest of a child: psychoso-
matic illness,' 9 0 low school achievement,' 9 ' reduced self-esteem, 192 and
juvenile delinquency.' Obviously, these threatened hardships are
rules for their application and an extended analysis of substantive due process. Both
investigations would exceed the scope of an inquiry into the procedural due process right
to counsel for children of divorcing parents. If the Supreme Court extends the "zone
of privacy" concept beyond the facts of the cases in which it has been analyzed, how-
ever, an "autonomy" argument may serve as added authority to support a child's due
process interests in divorce custody proceedings.
184. See notes 134-36 & accompanying text supra.
185. 419 U.S. at 576.
186. Id. at 574-75.
187. See notes 19, 164-65 & accompanying text supra.
188. See notes 11-16 & accompanying text supra.
189. See notes 11-16, 19, 80-81, 162 & accompanying text supra.
190. See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
191. See note 14 & accompanying text supra.
192. See note 11 & accompanying text supra.
193. See note 13 & accompanying text supra.
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grievous in terms of both their damage to normal growth and their
potential economic impact upon the state.
The Scope of Due Process Protection-The
Child's Right to Separate Counsel
As stated previously, analysis of the scope of due process protection
makes no use of general rules or standards. 9 The safeguards which
are appropriate to a given circumstance derive from a balancing of the
competing interests. 19 5 The right to independent representation is no
exception; the Supreme Court has expressly decided to resolve the issue
on a case-by-case basis.' 96 The balancing process, however, is neither
purely subjective nor wholly unpredictable. The instances in which the
Court has confronted the question serve as bench marks for discussion
of the right to counsel in other contexts.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 9 7 the Court held that notice and hearing, the
foundational requisites of due process, were inadequate by themselves to
protect a person from an unjustified deprivation of public assistance
payments. 98 Quoting from Powell v. Alabama,199 a criminal case, the
Court explained that "[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases,
of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by coun-
sel. 200 The Court noted that the severe financial burden which would
befall the welfare recipient upon erroneous termination of benefits
greatly outweighed the state's interests in summary adjudication and
protection of the public treasury.20' The opinion reasoned that counsel
could help to "delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an
orderly manner, conduct cross-examination, and generally safeguard the
interests of the recipient. ' 202  Although the Court declined to extend its
analysis beyond the right to retain an attorney when representation was
desired,203 nothing in the opinion foreclosed an argument for appointed
counsel under different, deserving circumstances.
In Goss v. Lopez,20 4 as already mentioned, the Court denied that
students subject to short suspension from public school have a right to
retained counsel. 20 5 Nevertheless, the opinion left open the question of
194. See notes 139-53 & accompanying text supra.
195. See note 140 & accompanying text supra.
196. See note 149 & accompanying text supra.
197. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
198. Id. at 268-71.
199. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
200. 397 U.S. at 270 (citation omitted).
201. Id. at 265-66.
202. Id. at 270-71.
203. Id. at 270.
204. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
205. 419 U.S. at 583.
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independent representation for suspensions exceeding ten days or for
"unusual situations. ' 20 6 Examples of the circumstances which would
justify the services of counsel were not provided.
The variables which the Court stressed in permitting or denying
separate representation in Goldberg and Goss provide a framework for
discussion of the child's right to independent represenation in the di-
vorce custody proceeding. The opinion in Goss intimated that time
may play a role in the determination. A deprivation of liberty beyond
ten days was a factor which might have tipped the scales in favor of a
right to counsel.20 7 The custody decree, by comparison, is often perma-
nent; it is seldom modified except on a showing of change in circum-
stances.20 8 The Court in Goss further indicated that the difficulty of
the proceedings in which protected rights are litigated may be an
ingredient in the balance. It found that the typical public school
disciplinary process did not qualify in this regard. 20 9 By contrast, the
divorce custody proceeding litigates the significant interests of the child
in an atmosphere which is adversarial and often rife with conflicting and
bitter testimony.
The Court in Goldberg emphasized that when stakes are high,210
the right to be heard has little substance unless it includes the right to be
heard by counsel.211 The minor's stakes in a divorce custody proceed-
ing are obviously high. The child depends upon the adult parties and
the court to advocate his interests in an environment conducive to
normal psychological development and in the stability of the family unit.
Yet because the parents and the judge have additional interests to
protect, 212 the advocacy includes no guarantee of forcefulness. The
child needs the guiding hand of counsel to help delineate the issues,
present the factual contentions in an orderly manner, and generally
safeguard his special concerns. 213
The holding in Goldberg was limited to the right to retain counsel.
Extension of a similar privilege to the child of divorce would serve little
purpose. Few minors have the sophistication or the financial resources
to secure the services of an attorney without assistance. The child
requires an unqualified right to demand appointed counsel in those
custody proceedings which threaten deprivation of his separate interests.
206. Id. at 584.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Stephens v. Stephens, 47 Ala. App. 396, 255 So. 2d 338 (1971).
Contra, King v. King, 477 P.2d 356 (Alas. 1970).
209. 419 U.S. at 583-84.
210. 397 U.S. at 266.
211. Id. at 270.
212. See notes 46, 60 & accompanying text supra.
213. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
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Applying the Constitutional Right to Counsel
Recent Decisions
Assertion of the constitutional argument for the right to counsel
has already met strong resistance. Three recent decisions provide suffi-
cient illustration. In Salaices v. Sabraw,2 14 three minor children, aged
ten, eleven, and thirteen, sued in federal district court to enjoin the
enforcement of a visitation order against their mother, claiming a due
process right to participate in the decision through separate counsel or
guardian ad litem. Mrs. Salaices, the natural mother, and Mr. Hidalgo,
the natural father, had divorced in 1970. The final decree awarded
custody to the mother and reasonable visitation rights to the father.
Neither parent attempted to compel regular visits until November of
1974, when Mr. Hidalgo brought a contempt proceeding against Mrs.
Salaices to enforce the original order.2
15
During the superior court trial, the children attempted to intervene
on the ground that neither parent could adequately convey their opposi-
tion to visits with Mr. Hidalgo. The record indicates that the mother
had no interest in the outcome. She simply denied that she had
interfered with the visitation order.216 The affidavits of two of the three
children disclosed a clear wish to avoid association with their father.
Each indicated that he had received physical abuse from Mr. Hidalgo
during previous visits. 217
The superior court judge attempted to evaluate the controversy by
appointing a social worker to prepare a report of the plaintiffs' needs
and interests,21 8 by speaking with the oldest of the three children in
chambers,21 ' and by hearing the argument of proposed counsel on two
occasions.220  The plaintiffs argued that the judge had denied the
motion to intervene before receiving the report from the social work-
er.
2 2 1
Thus, the plaintiffs presented a strong case for their asserted due
process rights: disputed visitation, a disinterested mother, a hostile
father, adversary proceedings, limited hearing of their wishes, affidavits
214. 400 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
215. Id. at 368.
216. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction and in Re-
sponse to Defendant's Opposition at 7, Salaices v. Sabraw, 400 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Cal.
1975).
217. Affidavit of Daniel Salaices, Affidavit of Lauren Salaices, Salaices v. Sabraw,
400 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
218. 400 F. Supp. at 369.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction and in Response
to Defendant's Opposition at 12, Salaices v. Sabraw, 400 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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attesting to the unsatisfactory nature of the visits, and failure to consider
the social worker's report. Nonetheless, the federal court ruled that the
superior court judge and the attorneys for the parents had adequately
considered the interests of the children 22 and rejected the constitutional
argument as unsupported by the evidence.223
In Goldsmith v. Jekanowski,224 by contrast, a federal district court
enjoined the enforcement of a custody decree and ordered a hearing on
the minor plaintiffs asserted right under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to participate in the placement decision through
retained counsel. 225 The plaintiff, Kyneret Goldsmith, was eleven years
old at the time of suit. Her parents had separated in November 1972
and divorced in September 1974. She had lived with her mother in
Massachusetts for the entire period. During custody proceedings in
February 1975, the probate court awarded custody to the father, a
resident of Illinois. Within three days of forcible removal, 26 Kyneret
fled her fat-her's home and returned to her mother, who secured a stay of
execution of the custody decision by a single justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts. After argument, however, the full
court affirmed the placement and dismissed a motion by Kyneret to
intervene in the proceedings through retained counsel.227 The plaintiff
appealed to the federal district court, which granted an injunction
against enforcement of the custody award on grounds of potential
psychological harm to Kyneret, interruption of schooling, absence of
harm in maintaining the status quo, and likelihood of success on the
constitutional argument.228
Although Goldsmith received a more favorable review in federal
court than Salaices, each illustrates the unyielding opposition of state
courts to the assertion of a child's due process right to counsel in custody
or visitation proceedings. Furthermore, the federal court in Goldsmith
chose not to settle the constitutional claim, merely noting instead the
likelihood of its success on rehearing. To date, therefore, no federal
court -has favorably analyzed the due process argument.
In Leigh v. Aiken,229 the divorced mother of a twelve-year-old boy
222. 400 F. Supp. at 369.
223. Id. at 368.
224. Civil No. 75-1308-F (D. Mass., Apr. 28, 1975).
225. Memorandum and Injunctive Order, Goldsmith v. Jekanowski, Civil No. 75-
1308-F (D. Mass., Apr. 28, 1975).
226. Petitioner's Memorandum of Law in Support of Her Motion for Release, Stay
or Injunctive Relief at 2, Goldsmith v. Jekanowski, Civil No. 75-1308-F (D. Mass., Apr.
28, 1975).
227. Memorandum and Injunctive Order at 2, Goldsmith v. Jekanowski, Civil No.
75-1308-F (D. Mass., Apr. 28, 1975).
228. Id. at 2-3.
229. 311 So. 2d 444 (Ala. Ct. App. 1975).
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argued that the trial court had erroneously deprived her son of represen-
tation by a guardian ad litem in her suit against the father for modifica-
tion of custody and visitation rights. The claim, raised for the first time
on appeal, asserted the child's right to separate representation under the
due process clause. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the
argument and stated flatly that custody proceedings have no bearing on
the due process rights of the children involved.23 0 It held the practice
of investing the judge with complete discretion to secure an award in the
best interest of the child sufficient to satisfy principles of fundamental
fairness.231
These decisions have a common characteristic. Each fails to speci-
fy the precise deficiencies of the due process logic. The explanation for
the dismissals of the constitutional argument may lie not in the weakness
of the claim, but rather in the courts' reluctance to authorize sweeping
modifications of existing procedures. For example, the court in Leigh
asked,
If counsel is appointed, whose view does he represent, his own
or that of the child? Is the child to be a witness and subject to
cross-examination? Is the child to have the right of appeal? How
is the cost of counsel and his expense of investigation to be as-
sessed?232
Problems of Implementation
When To Appoint Counsel
The constitutional argument discussed above does not qualify the
child's right to counsel. The balance of interests at stake in divorce
proceedings, however, may not convince every analyst that separate
representation is required in all cases. In any event, the right to counsel
should apply at the very least2 33 in circumstances involving disputed
custody or upon the recommendation of a designated family counselor.
The term "disputed custody" refers to all cases which require the
intervention of a third party, generally a judge or referee, to effect a
settlement. An earlier section of this note outlined the difficulties of
securing an award in the child's best interest within the context of an
adversary proceeding. 234 The attorney for each adult must try to prove
the fitness of his or her client for parenthood, no matter how equivocal
the evidence.235 Furthermore, the judge must fill two mutually exclu-
230. Id. at 446.
231. Id. at 450.
232. Id. at 448 (footnote omitted).
233. Other factors which the court might consider are the child's wishes, the par-
ents' wishes, and the opinion of the local social services department.
234. See note 46 & accompanying text supra.
235. Id.
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sive roles, as he or she is to function as both arbiter and advocate. 23 6
Unless there is a means to press the child's wishes at all times, the
disputed custody proceeding may litigate the claims of the adults alone.
In addition, it is suggested that courts be required to consider the
opinion of a family counselor237 on the need for separate representation
and to grant the right to counsel in all cases in which such representa-
tion is advised. Several factors recommend the additional input. The
vast majority of custody decrees receive limited judicial scrutiny. Courts
seldom have the time or resources to evaluate each award adequately.
They are therefore forced to provide rubber stamp approval for the
settlements reached by counsel for the adult parties.238
A counselor could help to resolve these problems by locating those
undisputed cases which show signs of casual or incomplete consideration
of the child's welfare. The practical application of this suggestion
would involve little added expense or delay. The parties who reached a
settlement through their attorneys would meet briefly with a trained
counselor to discuss the factors which contributed to the agreement. The
counselor would deliver his findings to the court accompanied by a
recommendation favoring or opposing a renegotiation in which a lawyer
for the child would participate. Naturally, this process would give
tremendous discretion to the counselor. Nevertheless, considering the
abuse of the child's interest which an ill-considered decision may in-
volve, the suggested procedure is a small price to pay.
A court should appoint counsel in a case of disputed custody or
upon the recommendation of a counselor without regard to the age of
the child. Maturity would create an arbitrary classification. An infant
and an adolescent may react to divorce in psychologically distinguisha-
ble ways."' Nonetheless, the potential for disruption of normal emo-
tional development exists for each. 240  Age may have a bearing upon
the tactics selected by an attorney to represent a minor client but should
not determine the need for counsel.
The Role of Counsel
Analysis of the role of counsel provokes several questions: Should
the child's attorney have legal powers similar to those of the parents'
attorneys? Would the court retain its authority to act as parens patriae
for the "best interest" of the child? How would the age of the client
affect the manner of representation?
236. See note 60 & accompanying text supra.
237. The counselor would be a court-affiliated or court-designated trained profes-
sional.
238. See note 3 & accompanying text supra.
239. See, e.g., GoLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNiT, supra note 10, at 32-34.
240. Id.
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First, counsel for the child should have the same powers as the
attorneys for the adults with respect to discovery, presentation of evi-
dence, cross-examination, and appeal. A less active role would preju-
dice a forceful advocacy of the child's views. The guardian ad litem
concept, for instance, fails as a comprehensive safeguard of the minor's
welfare precisely because the guardian lacks the authority to confront
the parents' counsel on equal legal footing.
241
The court would naturally retain some right to modify the normal
rules of evidence and procedure to protect the child's welfare. For
example, the judge could decide not to allow the child to take the stand.
Nevertheless, counsel for the child should have the right to appeal any
order believed to -have prejudiced his client's interests.
Second, the addition of representation for the child would clearly
diminish the court's discretionary power under the parens patriae doc-
trine. The judge would have an obligation to consider the views of the
child's attorney regarding the most suitable decree. The court would
have the ultimate power of decision, but the possibility of appeal would
reduce the chances of an award based solely on subjective grounds.
Third, the obligations of the child's lawyer should not increase or
decrease with the age of the client. The Code of Professional Responsi-
bility of the American Bar Association recognizes the difficulties of
advocating the interests of a minor24 2 and provides several guides for the
attorney. If the child is "acting through a guardian or other legal
representative, [the] lawyer must look to such representative for those
decisions which are normally the prerogative of the client to make. '2 43 If
the child "has no legal representative, [the] lawyer may be compelled
. . .to make decisions on behalf of the client. '244 In this instance, "the
lawyer should consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with
care to safeguard and advance the interests of his client. ' 245 In short,
nothing in the code permits the lawyer to dilute his loyalty to the child 246
or to provide less than a zealous representation 247 at all times.
The Cost of Counsel
The cost of added counsel should be paid by the adult parties, if
they are financially able to pay, or absorbed by the court. Opponents
241. See notes 48-50 & accompanying text supra.
242. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-11.
243. Id. EC 7-12.
244. Id. At least one court has recognized the incongruity of acting as both client
and attorney and has appointed a guardian ad litem for the child unable to make deci-
sions on his own behalf. See In re Dobson, 125 Vt. 165, 212 A.2d 620 (1965).
245. ABA CODE oF PRoFEssIoNAL REsPoNSIBILITy EC 7-12.
246. Id EC 5-1.
247. Id. EC 7-1.
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of the due process claim will raise vigorous objection to the increased
expense involved. Moreover, courts have the right to consider cost
when appraising the need for appointed representation. Nonetheless,
the economic argument should not outweigh the need for counsel, at
least in the two instances of greatest threat to the child's interests,
disputed custody and casually considered settlements.
Conclusion
Ideally, the divorce custody decision should reflect a considered
analysis of placement alternatives from the perspective of the child's best
interest. In practice, the assessment represents little more than the
court's opinion of parental fitness. Social service reports, recommenda-
tions by parents' counsel, and evaluation of the child's wishes may
increase the likelihood of a determination which serves the child's needs.
The majority of custody settlements, however, receive limited court
review. Contested cases pose additional obstacles to careful analysis in
the form of acrimonious debate and sharply conflicting testimony.
Nonetheless, the child has a clear interest in the accurate finding of fact
and the informed use of discretion.
The argument for a due process right to counsel attempts to resolve
the deficiencies of existing procedure. As courts and attorneys become
more familiar with studies of the psychological damage which may
accompany the ill-considered placement decision, due process claims
should become more prevalent. Until the means to effective representa-
tion of the child's welfare are improved, custody determinations based
upon the minor's best interest will remain an abstraction.
Maurice K. C. Wilcox*
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